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1. INTRODUCTION
Global fisheries are being dangerously overfished. At present,
over seventy-five percent of the world's major fish types are over-
fished or depleted.' Worse, this percentage has risen from thirty-
three percent in 19702 and shows no signs of abating.3 At the heart
of the problem are government subsidies -those subsidies that sea-
faring nations distribute to their commercial fishing industries in
order to increase their country's fishing production.4 By artificially
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF THE WORLD
FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 23 (2002) [hereinafter SOFIA] (stating that an esti-
mated 47% of the major global fish populations in 2002 were considered fully ex-
ploited, which means that such stocks are at their maximum sustainable limits in
terms of catch; 18% were considered overexploited, meaning that there is an in-
creasing likelihood that stocks will decline further and catches will decrease; and
a remaining 10% were considered depleted and, as such, are considered far less
productive than they used to be).
2 See Japan to Fight Subsidy Ban at WFO Fisheries Meeting, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
(Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter ASAHI] (noting that according to the Food and Agri-
cultural organization of the United Nations 75% of major fish types faced over-
fishing or depletion in 1999, jumping up from 33% in 1970).
3 See SOFIA, supra note 1, at 23 (recognizing that "as fishing pressure contin-
ues to increase. . .the number of overexploited, depleted, and recovering stocks is
increasing").
4 See Christopher D. Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade
Laws Trim Subsidies and Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 505,
514 (1997) (recognizing that an inherent problem of fisheries management is that
"the industry has been the historical beneficiary of public subsidy... [which]
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distorting the natural market equilibrium that would otherwise
limit overfishing and maintain sustainable fish populations, such
subsidies have a significant and detrimental effect on the fishing
industry.5 The problem is not limited to developed countries.
Overfishing also threatens developing countries, especially those
countries whose economies rely heavily on the fishing industry.
6
Recognizing the magnitude of the overfishing problem, the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), in its 2001 Ministerial Decla-
ration, instructed WTO member nations to begin developing and
considering specific WTO rules governing the regulation of fisher-
ies subsidies. 7 Nations have recently begun submitting proposals.
8
These proposals run the gamut from a complete eradication of
government fisheries subsidies to only eliminating subsidies that
can be shown to contribute directly to overfishing. 9
Previous attempts to deal with the overfishing problem-for
example, assigning property rights to fisheries 0 -have been
largely undermined by the looming problem of governments pro-
viding subsidies to their fishing industries." Subsidies that are di-
lowers private costs at public expense, [and, as a consequence, increases] the in-
vestment in fishing beyond the level that market signals would warrant").
5 Id.
6 See FOOD & DRUG AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OVERVIEW OF FISH
PRODUCrION, UTILIZATION, CONSUMPTION, & TRADE 2-3 (prepared by Stephania
Vannuccini) (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter OVERVIEW] (stating that 49% by value and
55% by quantity of the global fish production exports came from developing
countries, while 18% of the world fishery import value was focused in developing
countries).
7 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 750 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declara-
tion] (declaring the conclusions reached in negotiations by the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO") at the Doha Ministerial Conference).
8 See infra Section 5 and accompanying text.
9 Id.
10 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982
("UNCLOS") sought to rectify the problem by assigning property rights extend-
ing up to 200 miles into the sea to coastal nations, such that coastal nations would
have an incentive to curb overfishing and develop methods to create a sustainable
fish population. See infra Section 2 and accompanying text. However, in the sub-
sequent 20 years, the number of overfished or depleted fish continued to rise with
no foreseeable stopping point. See ASAHI, supra note 2 and accompanying text
(outlining Japan's proposal on subsidies given to fisheries).
11 See Margaret Borman, Can Governments Encourage a Reduced Fish Harvest to
Allow Global Stocks to Regenerate Their Numbers?, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LIG. 127, 137
(2000) ("[because] many subsidies in place in the fisheries sector are effort-
enhancing subsidies ... it is not obviously economically advantageous for fisher-
men to reduce their catch... [despite] catch restrictions, sound management
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rected toward funding and increasing fishing fleet construction are
the most harmful to the global fishing industry because these sub-
sidies most directly increase the capacity of the industry. 12
While eradicating subsidies will not be a panacea for all of the
fisheries' ills, it is an essential first step to eliminate overcapacity.
In recognizing the problem and requiring nations to submit pro-
posals for fisheries subsidies regulations, the WTO stands well-
poised to confront the problem head-on. The WTO should now
require WTO member nations to gradually yet completely eradi-
cate all of those fisheries subsidies that contribute to overfishing,
overcapacity, and the artificial distortion of the natural fishing
market equilibrium.
This Comment is structured in five sections. Section 2 de-
scribes how the oceans suffer from the classic tragedy of the com-
mons. Sections 3 and 4 will examine a previously implemented in-
ternational response to overfishing and two threshold problems
exacerbating the overfishing problem. In particular, these sections
will consider the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and how technology and government subsidies thwart its
purpose. Section 5 will consider the WTO's present response to
overfishing and its mandate for WTO member nations to resolve
the issue of fisheries subsidies. That section will focus on propos-
als from the European Union, the United States, Japan, and other
WTO member nations, and considers how these proposals will fur-
ther the goal of creating a sustainable fish population. The Com-
ment will conclude by demonstrating how fisheries subsidies dis-
tort the natural market equilibrium and encourage industry
entrants.
plans, and international treaties") (citing Matteo Milazzo, Subsidies in World Fisher-
ies 1-2 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 406, 1998)).
12 See Stone, supra note 4, at 513-515 (discussing the problem of overcapacity
in the fishing industry); see also DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 655 (2d ed. 2002) ("The use of government sub-
sidies to build fleets with modem fishing technology (that now bears more re-
semblance to a vacuum cleaner than a fishing rod) has created a situation where
too many boats are chasing too few fish.").
2005]
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2. THE GENESIS OF OVERFISHING AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRY
2.1. The World's Oceans as a Classic "Tragedy of the Commons"
13
The world's oceans were historically, and are today, largely un-
regulated.14 In his seminal article, Garret Hardin called this type of
common property use a "tragedy of the commons," because each
user acts in his best interest against the best interest of the collec-
tive group of users.15 Hardin used a farm pasture as an example of
why resources would not be maximized by people who shared the
right to use a piece of land. Hardin first hypothesized that a pas-
ture existed on which numerous farmers would graze their cattle.
Hardin then assumed that more farmers would add additional cat-
tle to the land and that at some point the number of cattle grazing
would rise to the level at which the pasture could no longer sustain
the number of grazing cattle, this being the moment of maximum
capacity. 16
But in Hardin's example, farmers would not stop adding graz-
ing cattle to the land, because each farmer knows that even in light
of the risk of over-grazing, if he does not add cattle, other farmers
will and he will thus lose valuable feed for his cattle, and money
from his pocket in both the short- and long-term.17 In other words,
he knows that what he leaves for his herd to graze today will not
be there tomorrow. So he decides to continue to add cattle, such
that he can at least maximize his short-term economic profits. The
problem with this reasoning is that every other farmer reaches this
same conclusion.
Thus begins the downward cycle of maximizing short-term
economic profits at the expense of long-term viability of the pas-
13 Many have also called this type of problem a "collective action problem."
See RICHARD L. REVESz, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 3-18
(1997) (discussing the tragedy of the commons and the problem of social cost on
environmental degradation).
14 For a complete discussion of the history and background of our world's
oceans, see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 655-60.
15 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
16 See id. ("The implication is that the free market will treat open-access re-
sources or public goods as being free. If the primary objective of the market par-
ticipants is individual wealth maximization, the market's failure to place limits on
use of the resource will invariably result in the degradation of that resource.").
17 Id. at 1244.
818 [Vol. 26:4
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ture. This cycle continues until the pasture is destroyed, over-
grazed to the point at which it cannot re-grow and sustain any cat-
tle. In Hardin's words, "[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to
all . "..."18
This road leading to over-grazing, Hardin contended, could be
eliminated if the pasture is privately owned.19 In such a case, the
private owner will have a long-term perspective because he need
not fear that other farmers similarly situated will consume the
land's resources. For this private owner, there will thus be no in-
centive to increase grazing capacity at the expense of the viability
of long-term capacity.20
The world's oceans are akin to Hardin's pasture.21 A commer-
cial fisherman has every incentive to maximize his catch in the
short-run. He knows that if he decides to consider the long-term
viability of the fish population and limit his catch, other fishermen
will not exercise the same restraint, and they in turn will reap a
greater profit at the expense of depleting the fish population. 22 Just
as Hardin's farmers could not risk losing both the short- and long-
term economic advantage of the property, every fisherman in an
open-access and unregulated ocean has an incentive to catch as
many fish as he can.23 There is - at the extreme - a race to catch the
last fish.24
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1245.
20 Id.
21 See Patrick A. Nickler, Comment, A Tragedy of the Commons in Coastal Fisher-
ies: Contending Prescriptions for Conservation, and the Case of the Atlantic Bluefin
Tuna, 26 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 549, 550 (1999) (analogizing fisheries to Hardin's
pasture).
22 See Hardin, supra note 15, at 1244 (stating that because "every rational
herdsman sharing a commons" concludes that he bears only a portion of the costs
associated with adding more cattle to the land, "[elach man is locked into a sys-
tem that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that it lim-
ited").
23 See Nickler, supra note 21, at 552 (stating that fishermen inevitably yet ra-
tionally "partake in a 'race to fish'- each attempting to catch as many fish as eco-
nomically feasible") (citing Anthony D. Scott, Conceptual Origins of Rights Based
Fishing, in RIGHTS BASED FISHING 11, 27 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1988)).
24 It is generally accepted that there are four stages in the tragedy of the
commons life-cycle: (1) discovery, (2) expansion, (3) overexploitation, and (4) col-
lapse. Karen Hopfl, Go Fish! Individual Transferable Quotas and International Possi-
bilities in the South Pacific, 8 COLO. J. OF INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 137 (1997).
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2.2. The Global Commercial Fishing Industry and Overfishing's
Impact
2.2.1. The Potential Economic Impact of Further Overfishing
The commercial fishing industry is a significant part of many
countries' economies. 25 In the United States, for example, the
commercial fishing industry contributes $28 billion to the U.S.'s
gross national product.26 As a result of this positive impact on its
economy, the U.S. has directed considerable resources toward care-
fully considering and creating sound ocean policy.
27
The fishing industry is not only a large component of devel-
oped countries' economies such as the United States and Japan, but
also many developing nations who rely heavily on fishing.28 De-
veloping countries composed forty-nine percent of world fishery
commodities exports in 2002, up from forty-six percent in 1992.29
25 See OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 2-3 (showing that in 2002 production of fish
from aquaculture practices (as opposed to inland practices) rose to 93.2 million
tonnes).
26 See U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2004) (providing a final report on the Commission's findings and rec-
ommendations regarding national ocean policy). Interestingly, the average
American consumes roughly 15.2 pounds of seafood per year. See PEW OCEANS
COMM'N, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE 55-68
(2003) (discussing the problems facing America's Oceans and making detailed
recommendations), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/env-pew
oceansfinal-report.pdf.
27 In fact, the United States was one of the first nations to come forward with
a government fisheries subsidies proposal in response to the WTO's Ministerial
Declaration. See infra Part 5.1. In addition to its active discourse in WTO sessions,
the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy has recently set forth a long-term road map
for U.S. ocean policy. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 26
(outlining the Conmmission's findings and recommendations regarding national
ocean policy). The Pew Foundation, at the request of the US government, has also
presented its recommendations for a healthy and sustainable ocean policy. See
generally PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 26 (making detailed recommendations
for addressing the problems facing America's oceans). This active discourse by
the United States demonstrates its commitment not only to creating sound domes-
tic ocean policy but also to an international framework that creates and maintains
a global sustainable fish population.
28 See OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 2 (concluding that "[t]he 86 Low-income
Food-Deficit Countries ... (LIFDCs) accounted for 20% of total fishery exports in
value terms").
29 See id. (demonstrating developing countries' increasing composition of the
fishing market).
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For these countries, the total value of the net-exports of fish-that
is, the "receipts of foreign exchange for fishery commodities" less
their imports -was over $17 billion in 2002, an increase from $4 bil-
lion in 1982.30 This amount dwarfs the second highest net-export,
coffee, which contributes to less than $5 billion in 2002, and is
greater than the combined net-exports of rice, cocoa, tobacco, and
tea.31
2.2.2. The Biological Impact of Overfishing
Overfishing also poses a significant biological threat to the
world's oceans. Just as fishermen fail to consider the long-term
consequences of overfishing at the benefit of short-term profit, they
also disregard the long-term biological ramifications of overfish-
ing. Atlantic halibut, for example, are "commercially extinct,"
meaning that their population is so diminished that commercial
fishermen cannot justify the expense of fishing for them.32 Simi-
larly, "by 1989, populations of New England cod, haddock, and
yellowtail flounder had reached historic lows." 33 Like these other
species, the Atlantic bluefin tuna's population has declined by
ninety percent since 1975.34
3. ONE PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE OVERFISHING
PROBLEM
The overfishing problem has been an issue at the forefront of
30 Id.
31 See id. at 17 (exploring the dramatic market for fishery commodities).
32 PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 26, at 2.
33 Id.
34 See Nickler, supra note 21, at 556 (documenting the devastation of the At-
lantic bluefin tuna population). As Nickler demonstrates, the Atlantic bluefin
tuna is a unique example of the perils of overfishing. The Atlantic bluefin is more
severely harmed from overfishing due to two of its characteristics: its unusually
long life-cycle and its unfortunate station as the most valuable fish in the world.
The bluefin is consumed all over the world, particularly in Japanese retaurants.
Thisdemand has resulted in it being priced at over $5 per pound. This value en-
courages fishermen to overfish the species which, in turn, results in a fishing race.
Each fisherman reasons that what he leaves in the ocean today will not be there
tomorrow. The Atlantic bluefin's long life-cycle also plays a large role in its de-
cline. It takes roughly eight years to mature. But such maturity is rare. The ma-
jority of bluefin caught are juvenile and have not reached the age at which they
can reproduce and spawn subsequent generations of bluefin. Overfishing exacer-
bates these two problems. See id. at 555-75 (emphasizing that without remedies
for overfishing, the Atlantic bluefin tuna is in danger of commercial extinction).
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fisheries management for decades. In 1982, the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS")35 was opened to
coastal nations for signature and in 1984 UNCLOS became effec-
tive.36  Recognizing the rapidly depleting fish population,
UNCLOS expanded property rights for coastal nations. In so do-
ing, UNCLOS sought to create an incentive for such nations to
manage their ocean resources responsibly .37
Prior to UNCLOS, a coastal nation's sovereign rights in the
ocean only extended three nautical miles from the coastline.38 This
area was, and is still, called the "territorial sea zone." 39 For the na-
tions that ratified UNCLOS, UNCLOS expanded this zone from
three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles.40 UNCLOS also cre-
ated two additional zones over which a ratifying coastal nation has
exclusive rights: contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones
("EEZ").41 These three zones-the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, and the exclusive economic zone-are measured from what
UNCLOS calls the baseline.42 The baseline is typically the low-
water line along the coast, but "it can also be a line joining fringe
islands, highly indented coast lines, or unstable coastlines."
43
UNCLOS's contiguous zones expanded a coastal nation's rights
twelve miles from the territorial sea zone to a maximum of twenty-
35 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
36 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 659. Many other regulatory measures have
also been previously proposed and implemented. See Stone, supra note 4, at 510
(detailing the lists of previous regulatory measures, which include "restrictions on
quarry, locale, gear, and seasons, and more recently, experiments with tradable
catch quotas"). Stone argues that such regulatory measures "have often proven
inadequate and even perverse," and concludes that the problem rests with the na-
ture of the world's oceans as a global commons, unregulated by any sovereign
body. Id. at 511. These regulatory measures, however, deal principally with do-
mestic fisheries management and consequently fall outside the scope of this
Comment.
37 See Borman, supra note 11, at 132 ("Part of the state's responsibility in these
areas is to ensure that resources (fish) are harvested to the highest level while still
maintaining the natural population.").
38 See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 261 (2d ed. 1994) (detail-
ing the historical meaning of the territorial sea zone).
39 Id.
40 UNCLOS, supra note 35, at arts. 33, 57.
41 Id. at arts. 33, 57.
42 Id. at art. 3.
43 Borman, supra note 11, at 131 n. 38 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 35, at arts. 5,
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four miles from the baseline. 44 Within this zone and the territorial
sea zone, a coastal nation has the right and "jurisdiction to prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations." 45 UNCLOS further expanded these zones with
its creation of EEZs.46 In the EEZ, a coastal nation has the exclusive
right, and jurisdiction to protect that right, to the resources
"whether living or non-living" within 200 miles from the coastal
baseline.47 In sum, the effect of UNCLOS's creation of these three
zones was to assign coastal nations exclusive property rights to
ocean resources within 200 miles of that nation's sovereign bor-
der.48
UNCLOS also required coastal nations to maintain a sustain-
able fish population in these zones while they attempted to maxi-
mize the harvest amount.49 Many coastal nations, however, failed
to heed UNCLOS's mandate. Instead, these countries shortsight-
edly exploited fish within their EEZ by adding new vessels to their
own fleets and not developing long-term conservation plans.50 The
nations that did develop long-term plans almost universally devel-
oped such plans with the national economy as the most important
focus, while glossing over the requirement to ensure the long-term
viability of the fish population.51
This lack of a long-term plan places the overfishing problem
back at square-one, because even within a nation's EEZ, the fish
stock is still being overfished and exploited. 52 The reason for this
44 UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 33.
45 Borman, supra note 11, at 131-32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 33(1)(a)).
46 UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 57.
47 UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 56.
48 Borman, supra note 11, at 132.
49 UNCLOS, supra note 35, at art. 62.
50 Borman, supra note 11, at 132.
51 Id.
52 Id. Additionally, migratory fish (fish which move between the exclusive
economic zone ("EEZ") of two or more nations) and straddling stocks (fish which
co-exist both within a nation's EEZ and the high seas) pose unique problems that
UNCLOS fails to adequately address and that result in continued overfishing. Al-
though article 63 of UNCLOS imposes an obligation to cooperate when a nation's
fisheries contains such fish -absent an agreement between the two or more im-
pacted nations, the economic incentive for a coastal nation to maximize fish capac-
ity is clear: the nation that has the migratory fish or straddling stock within its
EEZ would want to catch as many fish as it can, lest the fish migrate to another
nation's EEZ or to the high seas and never return. Further exacerbating this prob-
lem, article 62 of UNCLOS requires that a coastal nation harvest its "entire allow-
2005] 823
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
unexpected result is simple: fishermen simply have no economic
incentive to reduce their catch. What a fisherman fails to catch on
Monday, he reasons, will be caught by another fisherman on Tues-
day.5 3 And so the overfishing problem persists, unabated.
4. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IN THE
OVERFISHING PROBLEM
While the overfishing problem cannot be diagnosed with one
single explanation, there are at least two aggravating factors that
undermine UNCLOS and various other agreements between na-
tions: technological advances in fishing equipment and govern-
ments subsidizing their fishing industries.54
4.1. Technology
With the progression of technological advances, twenty-first
century fishing vessels are much better equipped to catch more fish
in a shorter period of time than their antiquated counterparts.55
One commentator has noted that fishing with twenty-first century
technology is more akin to vacuuming than traditional notions of
fishing with a rod, bait, and tackle.56
able catch" within its EEZ. Some nations are unable to meet this requirement and
must enter into treaties with other nations to allow those nations' vessels into its
EEZ to harvest the excess stock. Several coastal nations have entered into treaties
that seek to rectify these problems. For a discussion of three such treaties, see
Borman, supra note 11, at 133-34.
53 Borman, supra note 11, at 133; see also supra Section 2.1.
54 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 655 (stating that "[tihe use of govern-
ment subsidies to build fleets with modem fishing technology ... has created a
situation where too many boats are chasing too few fish.").
55 See Thomas A. Telesca, Sovereignty or the Precautionary Principle: Which Will
Save Our Fish?, 12 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 23, 25-27 (Fall 2003) (explaining current fisher-
men's greater capacity to catch fish). Telesca puts technological advances into
perspective:
Enhanced technologies have generated close to a fivefold increase in
global fish catch since 1950. Modem trawlers can "haul nets large
enough to swallow a formation of twelve Boeing 747 jumbo jets." These
vessels can catch twice as much fish in [one] hour as a sixteenth-century
ship could haul in a whole season.
Id. at 25 (quoting Colin Woodard, OCEAN'S END: TRAVELS THROUGH ENDANGERED
SEAS 43 (2000)).
56 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 655 ("The use of government subsidies
to build fleets with modem fishing technology (that now bears more resemblance
to a vacuum cleaner than a fishing rod) has created a situation where too many
boats are chasing too few fish.").
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Not only do vessels directly contribute to depleted fish popula-
tions by catching and retaining more fish, but these technologically
enhanced vessels also contribute indirectly to the overfishing prob-
lem by engaging in what is called a "bycatch" problem.5 7 A by-
catch problem occurs when fishing vessels catch fish above their
legal quota and therefore throw dead or almost dead fish back to
the sea.5 8 Globally, it is estimated that fishermen throw back
roughly sixty billion pounds of fish each year, roughly twenty-five
percent of what they caught during the 1980s and the early 1990s.5 9
Understanding how technological advances contribute to the over-
fishing problem is important because it underscores the need for
international cooperation to rectify the problem.
4.2. Government Subsidies
Many coastal nations subsidize their fishing industries. Typi-
cally, these subsidies take the form of "effort-enhancing subsi-
dies... [which have the effect of] undermining natural market
forces in fisheries." 60 Rather than subsidizing the industry in such
a way as to encourage fisheries to maintain a sustainable fish
population, "these subsidies encourage 'excess effort and capacity
and [undermine] the sustainability of resources in the fisheries sec-
tor." 61
Although estimates of subsidies vary considerably, the total
number is large by any estimate. The World Bank estimates global
fisheries subsidies at somewhere between $14 to $20 billion.62 The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") and Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"), by
contrast, puts the estimate at just over $12 billion.63 But by any es-
timate, the number is significant -even enough to artificially dis-
57 See Telesca, supra note 55, at 26-27 (arguing that technology has exacer-
bated the overfishing problem by collaterally catching more, and different species
of, fish than the fisherman intended to catch).
58 See id. at 26 (reinforcing technology's acceleration of the overfishing prob-
lem).
59 See PEW OCEANS COMM'N, supra note 26, at 43 fig. 4 (giving statistical back-
ground to the progression of fishing technology).
60 Borman, supra note 11, at 137.
61 Id. at 137 (quoting Milazzo, supra note 11, at 12).
62 Press Release, European Comm'n, WTO: Fisheries Subsidies - EU Tables
Proposal for Sustainable Fishing (Apr. 22, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news-comer/press/inf03 13_en.htm.
63 Id.
2005]
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tort the natural fisheries market equilibrium, resulting in overfish-
ing, overcapacity, and a clear path to the destruction of our world's
fisheries.
4.2.1. Forms of Subsidies
Subsidies take many different forms. Subsidies to the fishing
industry have historically and presently taken the form of "grants,
low-cost loans and loan guarantees for vessel construction and re-
pair."64 These subsidies include fuel discounts and support for
fishermen's wages and fish prices, the purchase of new gear, and
the construction of storage and processing plants. 65 In the United
States alone, subsidies programs permit United States commercial
fishing vessels to avoid approximately $250 million worth of fuel
taxes a year.66
4.2.2. United States Subsidies
The influx of the United States' subsidies to its fishing industry
was paradoxically borne out of the 1976 Fisheries Conservation
Management Act. The impetus for this Act was the United States'
concern about the number of foreign fishing vessels. 67 This act
sought to eliminate such vessels from the United States' territorial
sea zone.68 In exchange for being able to exercise exclusive federal
jurisdiction over the coastline, the United States offered subsidies
to domestic commercial fishermen, largely in the form of loan
guarantees for vessel construction.
69
The United States continues to subsidize its fisheries today.70 A
1999 report by the OECD, although now six years old, estimated
that the United States directs $1.1 billion dollars in subsidies annu-
ally to its domestic commercial fishing industry.
71
64 Stone, supra note 4, at 515.
65 Id.; see also Borman, supra note 11, at 137 ("The most common type of ship-
ping subsidy worldwide is an exemption from fuel taxes.").
66 Borman, supra note 11, at 137-38.
67 See id. at 138 (stating that the purpose of the 1976 Fisheries Conservation
Management Act was the acceleration and "elimination of foreign fleets from [the
United States'] territorial sea").
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. For a list of the present United States subsidies programs, see id. at 138.
71 European Comm'n, supra note 62.
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4.2.3. Japanese and European Union Subsidies
The Japanese government likewise directs massive amounts of
subsidies to its commercial fishing industry. While the estimates of
Japan's subsidies vary considerably, the low-end of the estimate is
$2.5 billion annually by the OECD,72 and the high end is $4 billion
annually by the Fishing Agency of Japan.73 Alone, Japan provides
more than $500 million dollars to fund vessel insurance and rein-
surance programs. 74 Its subsidies also take the form of support for
domestic marketing and fishing gear research.
75
The European Union, too, highly subsidizes its fishing industry
and contributes somewhere between $530 million 76 and $1.2 bil-
lion 77 annually. It focuses its subsidies on six major objectives:
"adjustment of fishing effort, fleet renewal and modernization,
processing and marketing, aquaculture, port facilities, and generic
product promotion."78
5. WTO's RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
In 2001, the WTO cast its line into the political ocean and for-
mally recognized that overfishing is an enormous problem for sus-
taining fish populations in our world's oceans. Section 28 of the
WTO's Ministerial Declaration provides that:
In the light of experience and of the increasing application
of these instruments by members, we agree to negotiations
aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines under the
Agreement on Implementation on Article VI of the GATT
1994 and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, while
preserving the basic concepts, principles, and effectiveness
of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives,
and taking into account the needs of developing and least-
developed participants. In the initial phase of the negotia-
tions, participants will indicate the provisions, including
72 Id.
73 Milazzo, supra note 11, at 18.
74 Id. at 19.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 21.
77 See European Comm'n, supra note 62 (noting that the OECD study esti-
mated that the amount of subsidies for the European Commission was $1.2 bil-
lion).
78 Milazzo, supra note 11, at 21.
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disciplines on trade distorting practices, that they seek to
clarify and improve in the subsequent phase. In the context
of these negotiations, participants shall also aim to clarify and
improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into ac-
count the importance of this sector to developing countries.
79
This declaration underscores the WTO's concern that global
government subsidies are undermining all nations' efforts to create
sustainable fish populations in our world's oceans. Implicit in this
declaration is the WTO's recognition that a global dialogue will be
beneficial to not only all the fishing industries of all WTO mem-
bers, but also to having a sustainable fish population for other
smaller, developing, non-WTO member nations.
The necessary dialogue has recently begun and WTO member
nations have started submitting proposals. This Comment will
now consider proposals from the United States, the European Un-
ion, Japan, and several other WTO member nations, followed by an
analysis of each.
5.1. The United States' Proposal
The United States' proposal calls on WTO members to eradi-
cate all subsidies that contribute to overfishing. 80 In defining such
subsidies that fall into this category, the United States adopts a
modified version of the "traffic light" approach.81 Under the
79 Doha Declaration, supra note 7, 28 (emphasis added).
80 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the United States:
Possible Approaches to Improved Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies, 3, TN/RL/W/77
(Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/asets/TradeSectors/Environ-
ment/EnvironmentalSubmissions to WTO/asset-upload file74_5970.pdf [here-
inafter Communication from the United States].
81 See Marc Benitah, Ongoing WTO Negotiations on Fisheries Subsidies, ASIL
INSiGHTrs, June 2004, 12-13, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh136.htm (ex-
plaining that the "traffic light" approach involves placing subsidies into one of
three boxes: red (forbidden subsidies), green (permitted subsidies), or amber
(slow down, meaning subsidies may be subjected to complaint on the basis of the
adverse trade effects)). The WTO at present has not imposed any specific provi-
sions regarding fisheries subsidies. In these situations, the WTO default subsidies
rules govern. Id. 3. These rules are found in the WTO Subsidies Agreement
("SCM Agreement"), which employs a traffic light approach. Id. 12. The United
States approach is meant to mirror this approach in an effort to provide consis-
tency among various WTO regulations. Another approach is what one commen-
tator has called the "no need for a special fisheries subsidies regime" approach.
Id. 5. This approach is exactly as it sounds: subsidies to regulate international
fisheries are unnecessary. Id. 6. This approach was originally proposed by Ko-
rea and Japan. See id. 5 (stating that Japan and South Korea, which heavily sub-
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United States version of this approach, the United States suggests
that in addition to "red light" subsidies (prohibited), there are also
"dark amber" subsidies (seriously prejudicial and presumptively
harmful) 82
The United States' proposal defines its category of "red light"
subsidies as those subsidies that "directly promote overcapacity
and overfishing, or have other direct trade-distorting effects."8 3
The United States suggests that these subsidies could be catego-
rized either by the type of program (that is, the programs "that are
deemed to result in overcapacity or overfishing"), or "by the fish-
ery that they benefit" (that is, the subsidies "that contribute to
overcapacity and overfishing in fisheries that are already over-
fished").84 Regardless of whether the WTO adopts the former or
latter approach, the United States proposes that these types of sub-
sidies be categorically eradicated. 85
Subsidies that fall into the "dark amber" category are those
subsidies that would be "presumed to be harmful unless the subsi-
dizing government could affirmatively demonstrate that no over-
capacity/ overfishing or other adverse trade effects have resulted
from the subsidy."8 6 If no such rebuttal were made by the issuing
nation, these subsidies would contravene the WTO international
agreement. An example of a subsidy that falls within this category
is a subsidy that is directed toward increasing the nation's annual
catch. Even a subsidy that is directed at, for example, certain types
of increased fishing output could be rebutted by an adequate
showing that the target area of the fishing is not overfished- in
other words, that the fish population in the target fishery is sus-
tainable.8
7
sidize their fisheries "favor this approach"). Having apparently recognized the
overwhelming international force against such an approach, both countries have
entirely abandoned this proposal. See discussion infra Section 4.3.
82 Communication from the United States, supra note 80, 5-6. The United
States makes no reference to a green light category, but it has been suggested that
the United States' proposal implicitly recognizes that some fisheries subsidies,
such as those that help reduce overfishing and overcapacity, would be continued
to be permitted. See Benitah, supra note 81, 16 (stating that the U.S. recognizes
that certain government programs may help reduce overcapacity and overfishing
and contribute to fisheries substantially).
83 Communication from the United States, supra note 80, 5.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. 6.
87 See id. (giving examples of how to rebut the presumption).
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Regardless of the category into which the type of subsidy falls,
a hallmark of the United States' proposal is notification and trans-
parency of each nation's subsidies. The United States urges the
WTO to adopt a system in which data are made readily available
for member nations to analyze and assess fellow member nations'
level of subsidies. To this end, the United States proposes that one
possible solution is to require member nations to provide "detailed
fishery-specific information, including information about relevant
management regimes."88
5.2. The European Union's Proposal
In its proposal, the European Union first defines the ultimate
aim of WTO fisheries subsidies rules: "to match capacity to the
available fish and so contribute to the sustainable exploitation of
fishery resources." 89 The European Union then proposes a traffic
light approach, but defines its color categories slightly different
than the United States. 90 Its proposal calls for a complete eradica-
tion of capacity enhancing subsidies, which it defines as "[s]ubsi-
dies for marine fishing fleet renewal (e.g. construction of vessels,
increase in fishing capacity); and subsidies for the permanent
transfer of fishing vessels to third countries, including through the
creation of joint enterprises with third country partners." 91
Unlike the United States' proposal, the European Union spe-
cifically identifies a "green light" category, those subsidies that, it
proposes, should be permitted under the WTO rules.92 It defines
these green light subsidies as those that "are necessary in order to
achieve the objective of reducing fishing capacity, and to mitigate
social and economic consequences of the restructuring of the fish-
eries sector."93 Examples of subsidies that fall into this category
would be:
* Subsidies to support the retraining of fishermen, early
retirement schemes and diversification.
88 Id. 7.
89 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission of the European Communities:
Fisheries Subsidies, 4, TN/RL/W/82 (Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Submission of the
EC].
90 See id. (proposing a policy in line with the SCM agreement).
91 Id.
92 See id. (using "[p]ermitted fisheries subsidies" language rather than traffic
light language).
93 Id.
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" Limited subsidies for modernization of fishing vessels
to improve safety, product quality or working condi-
tions or to promote more environmentally friendly fish-
ing methods.
* Subsidies to fishermen and vessel owners who have to
temporarily stop their fishing activity, when stoppages
are due to unforeseeable circumstances such as natural
disasters, or in the framework of tie-up schemes linked
to permanent capacity reduction measures in the con-
text of recovery plans for overexploited fish stocks.
* Subsidies for the scrapping of vessels and the with-
drawal of capacity.94
The European proposal does not define a dark amber category,
as the United States does.
In addition, the European Union's proposal makes an exemp-
tion for developing countries, recognizing that a blanket rule for all
countries would be improper.95 While noting that the develop-
ment of fisheries rules should be a global endeavor, it recognizes
that "more needs to be done to allow developing country members
to achieve legitimate development goals." 96 Without elaborating,
the European Union states that it "is prepared to engage construc-
tively in drawing up rules... which take special account of the dis-
tinct needs of developing countries in fisheries." 97
The European Union's proposal heavily stresses that transpar-
ency with regard to subsidies should be of utmost concern in fish-
eries subsidies negotiations. 98 In order to deal effectively with the
problem of fisheries subsidies, the European Union proposes that
in order to be in compliance with any ultimate WTO subsidies
rules, a member nation should have to notify the WTO Committee
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Secretariat of
that Committee would then keep a "scorecard," which would be
made publicly available. 99
94 Id.
95 Submission of the EC, supra note 89, 4.
96 Id. 6.
97 Id.
98 Id. 7.
99 Id.
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5.3. Japan's Proposal
Japan, too, proposes a traffic light approach.100 As an initial
matter, however, Japan points out that "any real causality between
fisheries subsidies and trade distortion has yet been presented." 101
In so stating, it asserts that instead of "spending time for fruitless
discussions on trade distortion caused by fisheries subsidies, it is
much more important to realize the conservation and sustainable
utilization of fisheries resources in order to secure the food sources
for the future generation."
102
Similar to the European Union, Japan defines only a green and
a red light category, but Japan defines those subsidies differently
than both the United States and the European Union. Under its
green light category, which it defines as fisheries subsidies that
"promote the conservation and sustainable utilization of fisheries re-
sources," it enumerates various subsidies: for vessel reduction; for
research on and the enhancement of fisheries resources; for the
"conservation and improvement of habitats of fisheries resources;"
for the monitoring, control, and surveillance of fisheries resources;
for the "development and diffusion of new technologies to reduce
the catch of unintended small fish or untargeted species;" and for
the "protection of [the] environment." 103
Japan proposes a definition of red light or prohibited subsidies
such as the following: illegal, unregulated, and unreported
("IUU") subsidies and those subsidies that contribute to overcapac-
ity.104 IUU subsidies, as defined by Japan, are those subsidies that
"do not abide by management rules set by national or international
authorities, [are] not regulated, and [are] not report[ed]."105 An ex-
ample of such a subsidy is an operation that transfers a fishing ves-
sel's registration to another country in order to evade an interna-
tional agreement, while still operating within the original
100 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Paper by Japan: Proposal on Fisheries Sub-
sidies, 7 6-13, TN/RL/W/164 (Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Paper by Japan]. Japan
asserted that there was no need for the WTO to develop fisheries subsidies regula-
tions, stating that it would oppose any approach to regulate subsidies. See supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
101 Paper by Japan, supra note 100, 5.
102 Id. (emphasis omitted).
103 Id. 7.
104 Id. 9.
105 Id. 10.
[Vol. 26:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss4/6
GLOBAL FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
country.106
As for its rejection of subsidies that contribute to overcapacity,
while recognizing that "vessel construction subsidies are the centre
of the problem," Japan asserts that not all subsidies directed to-
ward construction will adversely impact the fish population. 07
Only those subsidies for vessels engaged in "poorly managed fish-
eries," it asserts, should be prohibited.'08 Thus, if the fishery is
"properly managed" and if subsidies will not result in the increase
of total fishing capacity, it asserts that "these subsidies for vessel
construction should be permitted as they do not result in the dete-
rioration of resources." 109 A properly managed fishery, according
to Japan, is one that
(a) .. .abide[s] by its management regulation, in [the] case
of the fisheries which target the resource subject to the
management of an [sic] regional fisheries management or-
ganization, or
(b) when the fishing activities are managed under effective
resources management framework such as licensing and
community-based management based on a proper evalua-
tion of the resource, in other cases." 0
Japan, like the European Union, also makes a concession for
developing countries."' It asserts that "it is important to balance
the conservation of resources and sustainable utilization consider-
ing the fact that some developing countries are among the world's
largest fishing and/or fisheries products exporting countries."1u2
5.4. Other WTO Member Nations
The other WTO member nations that have submitted proposals
fall within one of the above three approaches within the traffic
light approach." 3 New Zealand, for example, follows the Euro-
106 Id.
107 Paper by Japan, supra note 100, 13.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (emphasis omitted).
111 Id. 16.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Questions and Comments from
Korea on New Zealand's Communication on Fisheries Subsidies (TN/RLW/154), 9,
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pean Union approach, insofar as it does not include an amber cate-
gory. 114 New Zealand, however, defines their red and green light
categories differently.115 It states that green light categories would
only include "limited and defined exceptions." 116 By contrast, its
red light category would not be so carefully defined. 117 It has only
proposed two tests for the WTO to construct this category: either
forbid those subsidies that reduce fixed or variable costs, or forbid
those subsidies that enhance revenues or incomes.
118
5.5. Analysis of the Impact of Subsidies on Fish Population
Conservation
The magnitude of global fisheries subsidies leaves little doubt
that such subsidies remain a large force in the overfishing problem.
Whether it is subsidies for vessel construction or modernization, or
subsidies for domestic marketing -these subsidies plainly contrib-
ute to the artificial growth of the global fishing industry. In so do-
ing, these subsidies play an indisputable role in creating an unsus-
tainable fish population and biological damage in the form of
inducing possible premature extinction.
Subsidies are derived from coastal nations' desire to promote
domestic growth in the industry. 119 As the industry is mature and
saturated with fishermen, however, these subsidies artificially dis-
tort the natural market equilibrium that would otherwise curb
overfishing.120 Consider the following garden variety supply-and-
demand model: the worldwide removal of subsidies for fishermen
TN/RL/W/160 (June 8, 2004) (echoing Japan's assertion that "[s]ubsidies do not
inevitably contribute to resource depletion; nor are they inherently good or bad.").
114 See WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from New Zealand:
Fisheries Subsidies: Overcapacity and Overexploitation, 2, 14, TN/RL/W/154
(Apr. 26, 2004) (describing New Zealand's acceptance of prohibitions including
exceptions and transitional provisions).
115 See id. (emphasizing New Zealand's broad category definitions).
116 Id. 14.
117 Id. 2-3. (detailing three possible approaches to defining New Zealand's
red light categories).
118 Id. 6 (quoting WTO Comm. on Trade and Environment, Communication
from the United States: Environmentally-Harmfu1 and Trade-Distorting Subsidies in
Fisheries, 8, WTT/CTE/W/154 (July 4, 2000).
119 See, e.g., discussion supra Section 3.2.2; see also Borman, supra note 11, at 139
("Subsidies originated as a way to encourage growth in the industry.").
120 See Stone, supra note 4, at 514 (demonstrating that "[s]ubsidization lowers
private costs at public expense, thereby increasing the investment in fishing be-
yond the level that market signals would warrant").
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would increase fish prices globally because fishermen would be
unable to rely on government funding for many operating costs,
such as marketing or vessel construction and maintenance. In or-
der to maintain a profit margin, fishermen would consequently
raise prices to cover those operating costs previously subsidized by
their government. With a higher price, consumers would on bal-
ance buy less fish.121 Seeing this decreased consumption, fisher-
men would in turn cut back on their catch in order to prevent
waste in the form of unsold fish. In short, the market would natu-
rally begin to correct itself.
Another large problem with granting subsidies is that they en-
courage entrants into the fishing industry. 122 A commercial fish-
erman contemplating whether to enter the market will perform an
analysis of potential profits and begin with the assumption that
government subsidies will cover a certain percentage of his operat-
ing costs. This fact alone makes the fishing industry appear more
desirable, inducing people to enter it. The natural extension of this
observation is that more boats will be fishing the same overfished
and depleted stock.
In making this blanket statement about the negative effects of
subsidies on the overfishing problem, let us be clear that not all
subsidies contribute to overfishing. 123 That is to say that there are
some subsidies that are positive for the fishing industry -namely,
those subsidies that do not encourage a greater catch and growth
in the fishing industry. 124 For example, positive subsidies could
provide interim support for fishermen while the negative subsidies
are phased out.1 25 Alternatively, positive subsidies could be di-
121 The decrease in demand at the higher price depends on the elasticity of the
demand of fish. The less elasticity that exists within the demand curve, the less
likely it will be that consumers will demand less fish at the increased price. Cor-
respondingly, the more elasticity there is in the demand curve, the more likely it is
that consumers will demand less fish at the increased price. Even assuming that
the fishing industry is rather inelastic -because, for example, if large numbers of
Americans are reluctant to give up their sushi and sashimi -there will still be
lower demand as the price increases; the decrease in demand simply may not be
as large.
122 Stone, supra note 4, at 514.
123 See Borman, supra note 11, at 140 (explaining that some subsidies allow the
fishing industry to rely less on government subsidies).
124 See id. (emphasizing how subsidies may initiate a reduction of activity
within the fishing industry).
125 See Stone, supra note 4, at 534 (addressing the presence of catch-reducing
subsidies).
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rected towards paying fishermen to "decommission, scrap, or tem-
porarily lay up their vessels." 126 The distinction between negative
and positive subsidies is especially important when considering
regulations governing subsidies because completely abolishing
subsidies would have an enormously negative impact on the fish-
ing industry.127 By immediately forcing fishermen to cover their
entire operating costs, governments would decimate the fishing
industry.
How should the WTO handle Japan's proposal of permitting
"research" subsidies? Before we answer that question, consider
Japan's history under the international whaling ban. In 1986, the
International Whaling Commission imposed a worldwide morato-
rium on harvesting minke and other species of whale.128 Despite
the moratorium, Japan (and other countries, including Norway
and Iceland) has allowed its fleets to kill at least several hundred
whales each year 129 under an exception in the moratorium allowing
hunting for "research." 130 The fatal flaw with Japan's reliance on
126 Id.
127 See Borman, supra note 11, at 140 (explaining that subsidies could solve this
problem, as "positive subsidies could be used to wean the industry off govern-
ment support through a gradual fade-out, leaving behind an infrastructure capa-
ble of sustainable fisheries management").
128 See Thomas Kenworthy, No U.S. Sanctions Against Norway, WASH. POST, Oct.
5, 1993, at A27 (describing the International Whaling Commission's worldwide
ban).
1
29 See INSTITUTE OF CETACEAN RESEARCH, JAPAN'S WHALE RESEARCH PROGRAM
UNDER SPECIAL PERMIT IN THE ANTARCTIC (JARPA) 14 (2d ed. 2005),
http://www.icrwhale.org/04-B-len.pdf (listing in table format the actual number
of whales taken by Japanese whaling vessels during each of whaling seasons from
1987 to 2004). In fact, Japan announced at the International Whaling Commission
in June of 2005 that it intends to more than double its whale take in the 2005-06
whaling season from roughly 400±10% to 850±10%. See GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN,
PLAN FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF THE JAPANESE WHALE RESEARCH PROGRAM UNDER
SPECIAL PERMIT IN THE ANTARCTIC (ARPA II) -MONITORING OF THE ANTARCTIC
ECOSYSTEM AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES FOR WHALE
RESOURCES (July 14, 2004) (stating that the Government of Japan intends to take
850±10% during each of the 2005-6 and 2006-7 whaling seasons).
130 See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. VIII(l),
Dec. 2, 1946, 10 U.S.T. 952, 16 U.N.T.S. 72. This agreement states:
[A government that is a member of the Convention] may grant to any of
its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take, and
treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions
as to number and subject to such other conditions as the [government]
thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance
with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of
this Convention.
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this exemption from the general moratorium is that the whale
products from "research" hunts are being sold at a profit.'31 Thus,
by almost universal consensus, the so-called "research" exception
to the moratorium is effectively a loophole through which Japan's
commercial fishing fleet continues to hunt whale and, by exten-
sion, unfairly profit.132
The question then becomes whether the benefits of allowing a
so-called "research" exception outweigh the risk of a nation classi-
fying prohibited subsidies under the auspices of "research" subsi-
dies. Given Japan's use of "research" subsidies to support whaling
subversively, the answer should be an unequivocal "no." The cost
of constant policing and enforcement measures to comply with
subsidies classification would mitigate, or worse, effectively elimi-
nate any benefit or incentive to impose such subsidy regulations.
If the WTO does not enforce the rules, the rules will almost cer-
tainly lose their force. Moreover, Japan has every incentive to con-
strue the rules in its favor. Japan subsidizes its fishing industry
more than any other nation. 33 Japan has also shown its opposition
to any regulation of fisheries subsidies.134 The WTO should not
permit subsidies for "research" because of such abuses.
The WTO should thus adopt a bright-line rule with regard to
fisheries subsidies, especially those that could potentially fall un-
der the heading of "research." Eliminating all legal ambiguity
would likewise eliminate any costs associated with policing com-
pliance under a WTO scheme that would permit "research" subsi-
dies.
The WTO should also gradually phase in subsidies regulations.
For decades, fishermen relied on subsidies, and a complete and in-
stantaneous eradication would destroy the global fishing industry.
For example, a fisherman that one month has an interest-free loan
for his fleet could not incur a one hundred and ten percent increase
in his operating costs the next month without immediately having
to file for bankruptcy protection. A gradual phase-in of regula-
131 See Andrew C. Revkin, Save the Whales! Then What?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2004, at F1 (reporting on Japan's behavior of selling whale meat that was hunted
under a research exemption).
132 See id. ("Critics say the research, which is not reviewed by peers, is a
sham.").
133 See discussion supra Section 4.2.3 (identifying Japan as the leading subsi-
dizer of the fishing industry internationally).
134 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing Japan's resistance to
regulation of its fishing industry).
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tions is broadly accepted in the WTO member nations' proposals.
The WTO should allow a gradual phase-in of subsidies reduction
over a period of time in order to afford fishermen the opportunity
to modify their fishing behavior accordingly.
Some countries who are reluctant to abandon subsidies may
argue that fish stocks are not actually depleted, and that the status
quo should remain pending the results of conclusive research.
More specifically, such proponents may argue that, because their
shipping fleets have not endured a decrease in catch, environmen-
talists are fabricating and exaggerating the overfishing problem.
The evidence, however, completely belies this assertion. Numer-
ous independent studies have determined that present fishing
rates are unsustainable. 135 While estimates vary, the number of
depleted and overfished species is large by consensus.136 Thus, any
suggestion that overfishing is not a large problem facing our global
commons must be rejected out of hand.
6. CONCLUSION
The present lack of WTO regulations for global fisheries subsi-
dies in the global commons is a recipe for disaster. The stakes in
global fisheries subsidies are extremely high, not only because the
fishing industry is an integral part of many nations' economies, but
also because of the overfishing problem's magnitude.137 Although
previous international plans to reduce overcapacity in fisheries
have been carefully considered and implemented, the effectiveness
of such plans has been undermined by nations continuing to sub-
sidize their commercial fishing industries. The WTO's elimination
of those subsidies that contribute to overcapacity is a necessary
and critical first step in rectifying the overfishing problem. The
evidence that a WTO mandate is needed to require nations to
eliminate fisheries subsidies is clear and unambiguous. Ninety
percent of the large fish population is overfished or depleted.
Fisheries subsidies contribute to overcapacity and distort the natu-
ral market equilibrium of the industry. These subsidies undermine
many previously proposed and implemented governmental
mechanisms to cope with overcapacity. Additionally, by minimiz-
135 See discussion supra Sections 1, 2.2.2.
136 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
137 See Stone, supra note 4, at 536 ("Fish are one of the world's major traded
products.").
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ing operating costs, subsidies encourage new industry entrants
who further aggravate the overfishing problem. Admittedly,
gradually eliminating all fisheries subsidies that contribute to
overcapacity and overfishing will not be a cure for all of the
oceans' ills. Nonetheless, the eradication of subsidies is an essen-
tial step in reducing overcapacity.
The WTO is now well-poised to implement a strategy to cope
with the overfishing problem. WTO member nations have cast
their baited lures into the political ocean in the form of proposals
for subsidies reform. Such proposals typically recognize the need
for fisheries subsidies regulations internationally. The WTO
should require all WTO member nations to make a gradual, yet
complete, eradication of those subsidies that contribute to overca-
pacity, especially those subsidies that are directed toward vessel
construction. Moreover, given Japan's history of abusing research
exemptions, the WTO should specifically reject Japan's proposal of
allowing "research" subsidies.
Subsidies eradication is only the first step in rectifying the over-
fishing problem. Once the WTO tackles the subsidies issue, the
next - and perhaps more difficult - hurdle will be allocating fish-
ing rights to our world's oceans among individual nations.
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